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Developmental psychologists traditionally have conceived of childhood pri- 
marily as a time of positive change, or gain, and old age primarily as a time of 
negative change, or loss. Life-span developmental psychologists recently have 
challenged these assumptions, asserting that gains and losses are ubiquitous 
across the life span. While generally supporting this assertion, we suggest that the 
relation between developmental gains and losses needs to be considered in more 
depth. Even life-span developmentalists seem to have assumed that gains and 
losses are causally related, and that the direction of causality is determined by 
age. In this paper, we review previous considerations of gains and losses. Then, 
we show that losses during early life are not necessarily responses to gains, and 
that gains during later life are not necessarily responses to losses. Finally we 
suggest criteria and methods for assessing four alternative models (unrelated phe- 
nomenon, spurious phenomenon, suppression, and compensation) relevant to the 
causality and directionality of the relation between developmental gains and 
losses. 6 1989 Academic Press, Inc. 
This paper considers the role of gains and losses in development across 
the life span. Traditionally, developmentalists have conceived of age- 
related change during early life primarily as gain, and of age-related 
change in late life primarily as loss (See Baltes, 1987; Kagen, 1980). It 
now appears, however, that these conceptions of the nature of age-related 
change may be inaccurate. For example, several studies have docu- 
mented potential and actual gains in old age (See Labouvie-Vief, 1985; 
Perlmutter, 1988; Rybash, Hoyer, & Roodin, 1986; Salthouse, 1984). 
Therefore, life-span developmentalists (e.g. Baltes, 1987) have suggested 
that gains and losses are ubiquitous across the life span. This paper at- 
tempts to expand this view by examining more carefully assumptions and 
knowledge about the relation between developmental gains and losses. 
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The paper has two primary goals. The first goal is to expand application 
of the life-span perspective. Life-span psychologists recognize that “no 
strong psychology of life-span development can exist without solid re- 
search on earlier phases of life” (Baltes, 1987, p. 623). Yet, at present, 
life-span psychologists place a disproportionate emphasis upon adulthood 
at the expense of childhood (See Baltes, 1987; Hetherington & Baltes, 
1988; Skinner, 1987). This paper argues that a perspective emphasizing 
both gains and loss can contribute to a better understanding of develop- 
ment at all periods of life. We show that development of the nervous 
system in neonates, development of problem-solving skills in elementary- 
school children, and development of expertise in adulthood can be un- 
derstood best when the roles of both gains and losses are considered. 
Moreover, we propose that a perspective that focuses both on gains and 
losses is advantageous because it emphasizes the antecedents of devel- 
opment instead of simple age-related transitory states. 
The second goal is to offer new theoretical specifications about the 
relations between gains and losses in development. Currently, many re- 
searchers and theorists (e.g., Baltes, 1987; Chat-tress, 1985; Salthouse, 
1984) seem to suggest that gains in old age emerge to compensate for loss, 
and that losses in childhood are the results of gains in higher processes 
(e.g. Bever, 1982; Hagen, 1967; Klahr, 1982; Stevenson, 1972; Weir, 
1964). These suggestions assume that gains and losses are causally re- 
lated, and that the direction of causality is determined by age. In this 
paper we demonstrate the plausibility of alternate interpretations of the 
relations between gains and losses at different periods of the life span. In 
addition, we suggest research that could determine possible dynamics 
between gains and losses in development. The paper begins with a dis- 
cussion of the terms gain and loss as they apply to traditional and life-span 
developmental psychology, and to the present paper. 
CONCEPTIONS OF GAINS AND LOSSES IN 
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 
In this section, we consider the role of gains and losses in development 
in the traditional and life-span views of developmental psychology. By 
traditional, we mean the views that have dominated the field throughout 
most of the 20th century; life-span refers to the views that focus on the 
nature of development across the life span, which are most clearly artic- 
ulated by Baltes (1987). 
By gain, we mean the acquisition of new structures or functions, im- 
provements in the effectiveness or efficiency of old structures or func- 
tions, or the new application of existing structure or function to novel 
tasks or domains. By loss, we mean either the removal or disappearance 
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of existing structures or functions, or decrements in the effectiveness or 
efftciency of old structures or functions. Any particular gain does not 
imply “better overall,” and any particular loss does not imply “worse 
overall.” Our definitions of loss and gain are not limited to biologically 
based growth or decline; the acquisition of a new strategy is as much a 
gain as the acquisition of new synapses, and the failure to use an old 
strategy is as much a loss as the reduction in sensory acuity in the older 
years. We believe that developmental psychologists have selected a 
rather limited subset of the types of change that they study and measure, 
and that the selection of the type of change to study is influenced by the 
period of the life span under investigation. Specifically, in traditional 
developmental psychology, the primary focus for research on early life is 
on gains, and the primary focus for research on late life is on losses. 
Development in early life thus can be defined in terms of the cumulative 
effects of gains (See Kagen, 1980), and development in late life can be 
defined in terms of the cumulative effects of losses (See Bin-en, 1988). 
Two assumptions about the nature of human change may have moti- 
vated theorists to focus on gains during early life, and on losses during 
late life. The first of these assumptions is that development is a continu- 
ous, unidimensional process. This assumption is similar to what Kagen 
(1980) calledfaith in connectedness: developmental events are considered 
to be related to and based on previous events. New structure or function 
is derived from previous structure or function. For example, Piaget’s 
theory of cognitive development holds that cognitive structures associ- 
ated with formal operations emerge from those associated with concrete 
operations. Kagen suggested that “most psychologists regard develop- 
ment as constituted of long chains of derivatives; a process or compe- 
tence grows out of a prior one, and aspects of the former are incorporated 
into the later entity” (p. 34). The assumption of continuity may have its 
roots in the legacy of both Freudian and learning theories of development, 
which stress the role of past experience in understanding present behavior 
(Flavell, 1972; Kagen, 1980). 
A second assumption of traditional developmental psychology is that 
there is a specific goal towards which development proceeds. In Kessen’s 
(1984) words, “The idea of development entails the existence of an end- 
point; the child moves, steadily or erratically, toward a goal. . . . The 
problem of goals hovers over all attempts to understand human 
development” (pp. 4-5). In addition, the goal is often predefined, and 
thus the job of the developmentalist is to figure out how specific changes 
at different points in development are relevant to the progression towards 
the goal. For example, Piaget’s theory describes child development as 
proceeding towards a goal of formal operations, characterized by scien- 
tific, hypothetico-deductive thought. Earlier types of thought are devel- 
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opmentahy inferior to later types. Similarly, in Kohlberg’s (1969) theory 
of moral development, the child passes through several stages towards 
the goal of self-generated justice. 
Traditional research on aging has been equally influenced by the as- 
sumption of a goal: death. Age-related change during adulthood has been 
conceived as the opposite of age-related change during childhood. Re- 
searchers interested in biological effects of aging noted specific age- 
related changes in cell biology that could be classified along a scale of 
“senescence.” Models of decline adapted from biology were adopted by 
gerontological psychologists. The older adult’s decline was described as a 
connected series of losses in the direction of senility, lack of productivity, 
and ultimately death. Labouvie-Vief and Blanchard-Fields (1982) de- 
scribe well the traditional conception of old age: 
Questions of aging. . . become primarily questions of negative comparisons. Since 
adulthood was seen as the achievement of an apogee, little room was left for growth 
and reorganization; rather, adulthood becomes merely a period characterized by 
stability at best. Change in adulthood, however, was usually conceived in negative 
terms, and attributed to decremental biological changes leading to an eventual 
breakdown of adaptive behavior (p. 185). 
Alternate Approaches to the Study of Gains and Losses 
Several theorists have expressed dissatisfaction with the traditional 
conception of gains and losses in developmental psychology. For exam- 
ple, Kagen (1980) criticized the traditional focus on what he called deriv- 
ative change, and argued for other types of changes (losses) that could 
occur during childhood. Kagen asserted that the processes of replace- 
ment and disappearance, both of which are types of loss, may play an 
important role in child development. Replacement refers to the loss of one 
structure or function when another takes its place; disappearance refers 
to the loss of a structure or function without replacement. Kagen pro- 
vided several examples of how replacement and disappearance are or 
could be involved in developmental transitions. His consideration of 
these types of loss was motivated by his rejection of the assumption of 
continuity inherent in most traditional developmental theories. Similarly, 
Labouvie-Vief (1982) suggested that in childhood and adolescence “de- 
velopmental transitions may display profound disjunctive features by 
which earlier modes of thought and action, in being superseded, become 
partially displaced as well as transformed” (p. 164). Flavell (1972) con- 
sidered the possible role of loss in his conceptualization of the forms of 
developmental transitions. Kagen (1980) asserted that continuity of de- 
velopment is often more a construction of the developmentalist than a 
description of the nature of development. 
GAINS AND LOSSES 105 
Life-span conceptions of development. Based partly on these criti- 
cisms, the life-span perspective of developmental psychology has offered 
an alternate, integrated set of theoretical assumptions about the nature of 
development across the life span. Life-span theorists stress that “The 
process of development in any given class of behavior is complex, and not 
a simple movement toward efficacy such as incremental growth. Rather, 
throughout life development is always constituted by the joint occurrence 
of gain (growth) and loss (decline)” (Hetherington & Baltes, 1988, p. 4). 
Life-span conceptions of development are well articulated in a recent 
review by Baltes (1987). He suggests that the notions of multidirection- 
ality and multidimensionality are key to the life-span perspective. In his 
conception, these terms “describe facets of plurality in the course of 
development [and] promote a concept of development that is not bound 
by a single criterion of growth in terms of a general increase in size or 
functional efficacy” (p. 614). A full understanding of development re- 
quires the consideration of many different domains. At any given point in 
the life span, some abilities or skills are increasing, and others are de- 
creasing. Moreover, the life-span perspective does not posit a specific 
goal for development, other than successful adaptation to the environ- 
ment in which a person lives. 
As an example of multidimensionality and multidirectionality, Baltes 
discussed Cattell (1971) and Horn’s (1970, 1982) conception of intellectual 
development across the life-span. Two dimensions of intelligence have 
different trajectories across the life span. Fluid intelligence, or problem 
solving skill, declines during old age. Crystallized intelligence, which in- 
cludes knowledge that has been acquired, such as vocabulary and general 
information, continues to improve across the life span. According to the 
life-span perspective, adult intellectual development thus can be under- 
stood best in terms of the co-occurrence of losses and gains in compo- 
nents of intelligence. 
Intellectual development during adulthood is one of the most clearly 
articulated examples of the utility of the emphasis on loss and gain that is 
a characteristic of the life-span perspective. However, there are numer- 
ous other domains of development that could benefit from incorporating 
both gains and losses. Consider, for example, the development of auton- 
omy in adolescence. Traditionally, adolescence has been defined as a 
period of increasing gains in personal freedom; parents exert less and less 
control over the maturing adolescent (See Steinberg & Silverberg, 1986). 
However, recent research suggests that this portrayal is only half of the 
story. Although the influence of parents decreases during adolescence, 
the influence of peers increases. Thus adolescents are not necessarily 
more autonomous than younger children. In Steinberg and Silverberg’s 
words, 
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For most boys and girls, the transition from childhood into adolescence is marked 
more by a trading of dependency on parents for dependency on peers rather than 
straightforward and unidimensional growth in autonomy. During this time, young- 
sters become more emotionally autonomous in relation to their parents: They adopt 
less idealized images of their parents, relinquish some of their childish dependen- 
cies on them, and form a more individuated sense of self. For the majority of young 
people, however, the development of emotional autonomy during early adoles- 
cence is accompanied by increasing susceptibility to the influence of age-mates. 
Indeed, eighth and ninth graders demonstrate less autonomy in relation to their 
peers than do younger adolescents . . . (p. 848). 
This quote demonstrates that the acquisition of autonomy is best con- 
ceived as a multidimensional process involving both gains and losses. 
A second example of how the traditional focus on gains has led to 
oversights about losses concerns the life-span development of skill in 
sports, such as tennis. The main focus of the sports media is on perhaps 
the smallest fraction of tennis players who are good enough to compete 
nationally. In this group, a 40-year-old is considered a wise veteran, and 
only a player who displays dogged determination is able to continue to 
compete past the mid-30s. But this description of age-related change in 
tennis skill may apply only to the small minority of players who receive 
media attention. Although age brings losses in physical quickness and 
power, many tennis players may continue to improve their game as they 
age because they focus more on the strategic aspects of the game. Perhaps 
it is only at the extreme limits of competition-the extremes that receive 
the most attention-that physical quickness is required. 
One possible weakness in the definitions of loss and gain that we have 
used is that they fail to distinguish permanent and biologically based 
losses from losses that are more psychological and perhaps impermanent. 
One might argue that losses that occur in late life are more devastating 
than losses that occur in early life, or that gains that occur during late life 
are less important than those that occur in early life. We agree that phys- 
ical gains are more common in infancy, and physical losses are more 
common in old age. But there is no reason to believe that these physical 
losses necessarily undermine the overall quality of a person’s life. At any 
point in the life span, there are biologically based and psychologically- 
based losses and gains, and an understanding of the influences of all of 
these types of change is needed to understand the nature of development. 
Relations between gains and losses. Central to the understanding of the 
role of gain and loss in development is the relation between the two 
processes. We believe that life-span theorists have tended to assume that 
during early life gains cause losses, and that during late life losses cause 
gains. In other words, even researchers interested in the life span as a 
whole have assumed that losses in early life are byproducts of gains, and 
that gains in late life are byproducts or compensations for losses inherent 
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in biological aging. We argue instead that gains and losses are not neces- 
sarily causally related. Moreover, when gains and losses are causally 
related, the direction of causality should not be assumed to be determined 
by nor necessarily related to age. The possibility and direction of causal- 
ity of gains and losses in development should be evaluated in the same 
way as other simultaneously occurring phenomena; causality should not 
be assumed on the basis of a simple relation. 
There are at least four possible models of the relationship between 
gains and losses. The first two models do not assume that the processes 
are causally related. An unrelated phenomenon model predicts simulta- 
neous gains and losses that follow the occurrence of other simultaneous 
but independent factors. A spurious phenomenon model predicts simul- 
taneous gains and losses that follow the occurrence of a single other 
factor. The third and fourth models do assume that gains and losses are 
causally related. A suppression model assumes that gains precede and 
cause losses, and a compensation model assumes that losses precede and 
cause gains. It appears that researchers have assumed that the suppres- 
sion model applies to the relation between gains and losses in early life, 
and that the compensation model applies to the relation between gains 
and losses in late life. We suggest that there are alternate interpretations 
of age-related change that are equally plausible. The alternative interpre- 
tations provide new insights into the antecedents of particular develop- 
mental transitions. 
EXAMPLES AND INTERPRETATION OF GAINS AND LOSSES 
ACROSS THE LIFE SPAN 
In this section we consider three examples of development that can best 
be interpreted as the combined effect of gains and losses. In order to show 
the applicability of our arguments across the life span, the examples were 
deliberately chosen from different periods of life. Each example considers 
the value of conceptualizing development as consisting of both gains and 
losses, and of relinquishing assumptions about age-determined causal re- 
lations between gains and losses. Figure 1 illustrates the general nature of 
the developmental trajectory of gains and losses that is discussed in each 
section. 
We have limited our primary examples to the individual, psychological 
level. However, the gain/loss argument may apply equally to different 
levels of the analysis. For example, we believe our arguments are appli- 
cable to considerations of the course of relationships and social institu- 
tions. As relationships develop, the individuals involved give up some 
behaviors and beliefs and gain others. Similar arguments also have been 
made for understanding historical processes (Nisbet, 1980), and one could 
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FIG. 1. Conception of development: Loss and gain. 
conceive of the development of businesses and other organizations in 
terms of constant losses and gains; at any given point, some aspects 
increase, and others decrease. 
Gains and Losses in the Development of the Neonatal Nervous System 
Development of the neonate’s nervous system provides a concrete ex- 
ample of the importance of both gains and losses in development even in 
early life. Development of many areas of both the central and peripheral 
nervous system consists of an overproduction of synapses (connections 
between neurons or between neurons and receptors) followed by a grad- 
ual decline in the number of synapses. While the number of synapses 
decreases, however, other aspects of the nervous system, such as my- 
elinization, increase. In Nowakowski’s (1987) words, “it is of great in- 
terest (and some irony) that an important set of processes during the 
development of the nervous system, which is generally thought of as 
being a series of progressive events, are regressive events involving the 
retraction of axons and the death of cells” (p. 587). Examples of gains and 
losses in neonatal nervous system development illustrate that losses are 
characteristic of age-related change even at early periods of the life span. 
However, researchers have not assumed that these losses and gains are 
causally related. Loss and gain in the development of the nervous system 
thus can serve as a model of loss and gain in psychological development; 
loss and gain are both involved but are not necessarily causally related. 
Gains and losses in neuromuscular connections. One example of the 
role of gains and losses involves the development of neural connections 
between terminal afferent neurons and muscle fibers. Skeletal muscular 
action is controlled by nerves that branch outward from the spinal cord. 
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Histological examination and electrophysical stimulation experiments 
have shown that the pattern of connections between neurons and muscle 
fibers is quite different in neonatal and adult monkeys. In the neonate, a 
single neuron connects to several different muscle cells. In the adult, 
however, a single neuron connects to only one muscle cell (Purves & 
Lichtman, 1980). An interesting developmental process is responsible for 
this difference. During prenatal development synapses are overproduced; 
the adult pattern is obtained through the loss of the multiple connections. 
A relatively chaotic pattern, characterized by many synapses with mul- 
tiple connections, is replaced developmentally by a more efficient, pre- 
cise system, in which the contraction of a single muscle fiber can be 
controlled more accurately (Purves & Lichtman, 1980). Thus, attainment 
of adult structure and function depends both on overproduction and on 
subsequent loss of synapses. Through the loss of synapses, the infant 
gains more specific motor control and better coordination. 
The complete development of the neuromuscular system depends also 
on increases in the myelinization of nerve fibers. Myelin is a lipoprotein 
produced by special cells within the nervous system (oligodendrocytes). 
It insulates nerve fibers and thus allows for faster transmission of nerve 
signals. Myelinization increases throughout childhood, and provides the 
child with greater speed and reaction time in muscle movements (Nowa- 
kowski, 1987; Richardson, 1982). In sum, the coordinated and specified 
muscular actions of the adult is obtained through both gains and losses. 
Gains and losses in prefrontal cortex. A far more complicated and less 
well understood example of complementary gains and losses in the ner- 
vous system involves the development of neural circuitry in the prefrontal 
cortex. Researchers are only beginning to understand the importance of 
this area of the brain, but it is believed to be associated with thinking, 
reasoning, and information storage (Goldman-Rakic, 1987). Development 
of neural circuitry in the prefrontal cortex thus may have direct implica- 
tions for cognitive development (Fischer, 1987). Researchers have iden- 
tified a pattern of overproduction and decline in the number of synapses 
in the prefrontal cortex similar to that described in the development of 
neuromuscular connections. In rhesus monkeys the number of synapses 
in the prefrontal cortex begins to increase dramatically during the final 
third of gestation. The increase continues after birth, reaching a peak 
between 2 and 4 months postnatal. After four months, overproduction 
ceases, and the number of synapses subsequently declines gradually until 
adult levels are reached (Goldman-Rakic, 1987; See also Huttenlocher, 
1979, for a description of synapse loss in human cortex). 
This pattern of synapse production and subsequent decline may be 
related to important milestones in cognitive development. One example 
involves a particular area in the prefrontal cortex that is associated in 
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rhesus monkeys with performance on delayed response tasks. To inves- 
tigate the importance of the spurt in synaptogenesis in this area, Gold- 
man-Rakic (1987) devised a task similar to Piaget’s A not B task, in which 
infants must first wait and then search for a displaced object. At four 
months the monkeys acquire the ability to maintain a representation of 
the displaced object. Goldman-Rakic suggested that the growth spurt in 
the number of synapses corresponds specifically to the emergence of the 
ability to represent mentally the location of the displaced objects. Gold- 
man-Rakic drew analogies to the development of the prefrontal cortex in 
human infants and performance on Piaget’s task. 
The complete development of the prefrontal cortex and the abilities 
with which it is associated may also depend on the subsequent decline in 
the number of synapses. Specific demonstrations of the significance of the 
decline in the number of synapses in normal development are difficult to 
obtain, but researchers have suggested that the loss of synapses may be 
associated with gains in control or regulation of the abilities that emerged 
during the initial increase in synapses (e.g., Goldman-Rakic, 1987; 
Greenough, 1986; Rakic, Bourgeois, Zecevic, Eckenhoff, & Goldman- 
Rakic, 1986). Some forms of mental retardation have been linked to in- 
creased numbers of synapses (Cragg, 1975). The notion that important 
abilities such as mental representation may emerge before the ability to 
regulate and control these abilities is central in much current theory and 
research on children’s cognitive development (for example, Gelman, 
1978; Gelman & Baillergeon, 1983; Hasher & Zacks, 1979). The examples 
discussed here raise the possibility that this increase in control may be 
associated with a decrease in the number of prefrontal synapses. Figure 
2 shows our conception of gains and losses in the development of the 
nervous system. 
The processes involved in the development of neural circuitry are in 
some ways analogous to processes described in other domains of devel- 
opment and emphasized particularly by the life-span perspective. For 
example, one hypothesis of life-span developmental psychology is that 
plasticity is greatest early in life and decreases gradually throughout the 
life span (Baltes, 1987; Lemer, 1984). Researchers (Greenough, Black, & 
Wallace, 1987; Purves & Lichtman, 1980) have suggested that the pattern 
of overproduction of synapses followed by decline may have evolved as 
a means of providing plasticity in neural circuitry. Initially, many con- 
nections are redundant, but as the number of synapses declines, only 
those most useful in the environment in which the organism will live are 
preserved (See Greenough, 1986). Although the loss of the synapses is 
positive in that it is necessary for development of an optimally efficient 
nervous system, there is also a negative component: loss of redundant 
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FIG. 2. Loss and gain in neonatal neural development. 
synapses dictates that the organism loses possible alternative courses of 
development. According to Greenough et al. (1987), “At the neural level, 
the irreversibility appears to arise in at least some cases because a set of 
synapses has become committed to a particular pattern of organization, 
while synapses that could have subserved alternative patterns have been 
lost” (p. 546). 
Gains and Losses in Development of Children’s Problem Solving Skills 
Because of the growing popularity of the life-span perspective in psy- 
chology, the possibility of growth during old age seems less strange than 
it did only a decade ago. Although the majority of psychological research 
that is framed within the life-span perspective has focused on old age, the 
life-span perspective suggests that decline may occur during childhood. In 
the following section we discuss the most commonly cited example of loss 
during childhood, Weir’s (1964) work on the development of problem- 
solving strategies. Researchers have suggested that the growth of more 
advanced styles of problem solving in childhood may lead to the decline 
of less advanced strategies. After presenting Weir’s findings, we offer an 
alternate interpretation that does not assume necessarily causal relations 
between gains and losses. Specifically, we believe that the assumed 
causal relation between gains and losses may be spurious; in child devel- 
opment, both observed gains and losses noted by Weir may be the result 
of changes in cognitive styles and processing engendered by the separate, 
far-reaching intluence of schooling. 
In Weir’s research (Stevenson & Weir, 1963; Weir, 1964), subjects 
(ages 3 to 19) were presented with a row of three knobs and asked simply 
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to push the knob that resulted in the presentation of a marble. The task 
was complicated, however, by the manipulation of the probability of pay- 
off. In some conditions, pushing the correct knob resulted in the presen- 
tation of a marble 33% of the time, and in other conditions a marble was 
presented on 66% of the correct pushes. The probabilistic nature of re- 
inforcement made the task deceptively difficult. When learning which 
knob to press, there was no clear solution. The performance of younger 
and older subjects in these experiments illustrates an important phenom- 
enon that may shed light on the life-span dynamics of gains and losses. 
Specifically, the performance of subjects from ages 7 to I5 was worse 
than that of either older or younger subjects (See Fig. 3). Different strat- 
egies accounted for the differences in performance. Younger subjects 
responded on the basis of a simple reinforcement notion. They were not 
planful, but instead simply hit the buttons until they found the correct 
one, and then hit that one on successive trials. Weir suggested that 
younger children “may expect neither complex nor perfect solutions in a 
task of this sort, and behave accordingly” (p. 477). 
School-aged children, on the other hand, appeared to have dramatically 
different expectations. Weir noted that they 
enter this task with a strong expectancy that there is a solution which will yield 
100% reinforcement, or at least 100% predictability of when a reinforcement will be 
delivered and when it will not, and employ complex strategies based on complex 
hypotheses concerning the nature of the task and the reinforcement schedules (p. 
478). 
Adults eventually deduced the nature of the task and gave up attempt- 
ing to find a perfect solution. School-aged children, however, doggedly 















FIG. 3. Weir’s (1964) results on the probability learning task. 
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strategy was to repeat a pattern, such as left, middle, right. Some subjects 
memorized extremely complex sequences with as many as 10 separate 
responses (Stevenson, 1972). 
Weir’s experiments are a favorite of life-span theorists because they 
demonstrate clearly that development during childhood is not all gain. 
The results, however, seem to have been interpreted in terms of a causal 
relation between gains and losses. Baltes (1987), for example, interprets 
Weir’s results as follows: “This work shows that higher-level cognitive 
functioning (associated with the so-called optimization strategy) can have 
its costs when the task in question has no perfect solution” (p. 617). The 
statement that one strategy “can have its costs” implies that gains and 
losses are causally related; that is, that in this instance of early develop- 
ment gains cause losses. This example thus would represent an instance 
of the suppression model. 
We believe that there are alternate, equally plausible interpretations. 
For example, schooling might cause both the observed gains and losses. 
Differences in children’s thinking that emerge during the early elementary 
school years (the 5-7 shift-see White, 1965) are among the most consis- 
tent and pervasive in the study of cognitive development. The dramatic 
effects of beginning schooling on the cognitive, social, and emotional 
development of children has been noted by numerous researchers (e.g., 
Gay & Cole, 1967; Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition, 1983; 
Rogoff, 1981; Stevenson, Parker, Wilkinson, Bonnevaux, & Gonzales, 
1978). Schooling can lead to shifts in emphasis of cognitive abilities. Chil- 
dren are taught to apply their thinking to tasks that are not immediately 
relevant to their environment. Almost all theories of cognitive develop- 
ment view this age period as a time of important transition. Some re- 
searchers have raised the possibility that beginning schooling may be an 
important factor in this shift (e.g., Skeen & Rogoff, 1987; Stevenson et 
al., 1978; White, 1965). For example, Stevenson et al. (1978) investigated 
the effect of schooling and age on the cognitive performance of children 
in two geographically and culturally distinct areas of Peru. Samples of 
schooled and unschooled children of the same age (5 and 6) were com- 
pared. This design allowed Stevenson et al. to consider the additive and 
interactive effects of schooling and age. The effect of schooling was equal 
to or greater than the effects of age for most tasks. Figure 4 shows our 
conception of how schooling could lead to both gains and losses. 
From the life-span perspective, the effects of schooling can be inter- 
preted as a shift in the trajectories of many different abilities. One would 
expect that dramatic events of the magnitude of those involved in school- 
ing would lead to both gains and losses. It seems likely that children’s 
belief in the existence of a perfect solution to Weir’s task could be the 
result of going to school, where children typically are taught to look for 




FIG. 4. The effects of schooling on gains and losses. 
specific, perfect solutions. Indeed, the idea that children are taught that 
there must be a perfect solution to a problem has emerged as a central 
criticism of American education, and has led to the development of new 
curricula and teaching strategies that emphasize the ambiguity of real- 
world problems (See Segal, Chipman, & Glaser, 1985). Classes have been 
instituted in which children are taught to think critically about problems 
that have no perfect solution. 
The emergence of new strategies of problem-solving is analogous to 
development of the neonate nervous system. At first, there is a rapid 
emergence of new synapses (new strategies). Complete development of 
the nervous system depends on the loss of redundant synapses; complete 
development of problem-solving skills depends on the loss of the ten- 
dency to overapply newly acquired, higher level strategies. 
Research on other learning domains demonstrates that decline in the 
performance of elementary school children is not confined to the three- 
choice probability learning task. For example, research on children’s and 
adults’ incidental learning has shown that incidental learning declines in 
some tasks as other types of learning emerge. A study by Maccoby and 
Hagen (1965) is perhaps the best known, although other researchers (e.g., 
Crane & Ross, 1967; Siegel & Stevenson, 1966) have obtained similar 
results using different methods. Children in grades 1, 3, 5, and 7 were 
asked to memorize the location of different cards in a series. Cards were 
identified both by a colored dot and a picture of an animal or household 
item. Children were told to remember the location of the different colors; 
they were not given instructions about remembering the location of the 
pictures. Children’s memory of the picture locations therefore was a mea- 
sure of incidental learning. 
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Intentional learning increased with age, but the relationship between 
age and incidental learning was curvilinear. Seventh-graders remembered 
the location of significantly fewer pictures than did younger children. In 
other words, children’s performance on the incidental learning task de- 
clined as performance on the intentional learning task increased. Other 
research supports the present contention that these developments may be 
caused at least in part by schooling (See Wilkinson, Parker, & Stevenson, 
1979). 
Maccoby and Hagen’s (1966) interpretation of their results, and addi- 
tional interpretations by Hagen (1967) and Stevenson (1972), point to the 
relevance of the relation between intentional and incidental learning to the 
dynamics of gains and losses across development. These investigators 
suggested that older children’s good performance on the intentional leam- 
ing task and relatively poor performance on the incidental learning task 
indicates that younger children have not yet developed the ability to 
selectively attend to the relevant dimensions of the task. In other words, 
younger children are distracted by the incidental stimuli, and thus inap- 
propriately assign their limited attentional resources to learning irrelevant 
stimuli. Older children devote their attention selectively to the intentional 
material, focusing on learning the colored dots at the expense of the 
incidental stimuli. The development of selective attention therefore can 
be described as the combined outcome of an increase in intentional learn- 
ing and a decrease in incidental learning. Certainly schooling could intlu- 
ence this development; children must learn to focus selectively on the 
problem at hand (Wilkinson et al., 1979). 
Other research of this kind is consistent with the interpretation that 
both gains and losses can be related to schooling. Spatial skills are one 
specific domain in which schooling may lead to loss. For example, Skeen 
and Rogoff (1987) investigated the effect of different types of instructions 
on children’s spatial learning. Five-, seven-, and ten-year-olds explored a 
large playhouse containing several rooms under three conditions. In the 
Remember condition, children were asked to remember the location of 
the rooms as they explored the playhouse. In the Activity condition, 
children were asked to unroll a large ribbon as they walked through the 
playhouse. In the Remember-plus-Activity condition, children were asked 
to remember both the location of the rooms and to unroll the ribbon. 
Seven- and lo-year-olds assigned to the Remember condition remem- 
bered the location of significantly fewer playhouse rooms than same-aged 
children assigned to the Activity conditions. Five-year-olds’ performance 
did not vary by condition. Skeen and Rogoff suggested that 7-year-olds in 
the Remember condition attempted to apply inappropriate memory strat- 
egies, such as remembering a list of the rooms rather than using a spatial 
strategy more appropriate for the task. They argued that the tendency to 
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use list strategies could be the result of schooling, in which children focus 
their cognitive abilities on learning lists of materials. One finding consis- 
tent with this conclusion is that schooled children in the Peruvian high- 
lands performed significantly worse on three of four spatial tasks than 
same-aged unschooled children (Barber, Uttal, & Stevenson, 1987). As 
children apply their thinking to new types of problems, whether in school 
or in other situations, performance can decline in other domains. It should 
be noted that some researchers have observed very dramatic effects of 
schooling after only a few months (See Laboratory of Comparative Hu- 
man Cognition, 1983). 
Gains and Losses in Adults’ Cognitive Performance 
Most discussions of the relation between gains and losses in old age 
seem to suggest that gains are caused by losses. Researchers have sug- 
gested that older adults gain new skills as a result of, or to compensate 
for, biologically based losses. These interpretations typically imply that 
the loss precedes and at least indirectly causes the gain. For example, 
Baltes (1987) describes old age as a time of selective optimization with 
compensation, in which people refocus their efforts and abilities in order 
to maintain functioning despite age-related decline. In Baltes’ (1987) 
words, one of the features of selective optimization with compensation is 
“individual selective and compensatory efforts dealing with evolving def- 
icits for the purpose of mastery and effective aging” (p. 616). This quote 
demonstrates the implicit assumption that losses during old age cause 
gains. 
Other discussions of the relation between gains and losses also seem to 
imply that gains occur in response to loss. Pascual-Leone (1983), for 
example, suggested that changes in adult thinking are brought about 
largely because of physiological decline in operators, which are cognitive 
structures that influence thinking. He suggested that a decline in the Z 
(interrupt) operator begins in the mid-30s. The purpose of the Z interruptor 
is to repress conflicts resulting from beliefs that may be logically incon- 
sistent. Regression of the operator causes a crisis (e.g., the mid-life crisis) 
because the individual no longer can repress the inconsistent beliefs. 
Pascual-Leone argued that “the individual faces up to conflicts within his 
or her ego structures that were already there but heretofore could be 
avoided by interruption of the undesirable partial selfs. Now interruption 
is no longer effective and a disequilibration (in the sense of Piaget), or the 
anxiety that goes with it, prompts the organism to seek a way of resolving 
the contradictions” (p. 141). Similarly, Pascual-Leone suggested that new 
styles and contents of thought emerge in old-age because of the regression 
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of other operators. He assumed that a new style of problem resolution (a 
gain) emerges because of and is caused by a loss in the strength of the 
operators. 
The idea that gains in later adulthood are caused by biologically based 
losses is also apparent in empirical work. Perhaps the best-known exam- 
ple is Salthouse’s (1984) research on the effects of age and experience on 
typing skills. The skills involved in typing are relatively easy to investi- 
gate as separate components, and thus it is possible to determine pre- 
cisely which of the component processes are affected by age and experi- 
ence. In addition, skilled typing provides a domain in which to investigate 
an expertise that has been acquired in a natural context. Some research- 
ers have suggested that older adults may perform worse than younger 
adults in traditional comparisons simply because the older adults have 
had less experience with the experimental method or setting. These dif- 
ferences should be less important in the study of typing skills because the 
task is very familiar to typists of all ages. 
Salthouse used a variant of Charness’ (1981a, 1981b) molar equiva- 
lence-molecular decomposition experimental design to investigate the 
independent and interactive effects of age and experience on typing 
speed. Subjects were sampled from a wide range of age and experience 
levels so that the correlation between age and overall performance on the 
dependent variable approached zero. This method allowed Salthouse to 
determine how different components of typing skill were affected by age 
and by experience. Salthouse found interesting age and experience dif- 
ferences in the components of typing that suggest the influence of both 
gains and losses in the maintenance of a skill across the life span. Salt- 
house’s research also illustrates the need for caution in inferring a par- 
ticular causal direction between gains and losses. 
One important component of typing speed that Salthouse investigated 
is reaction time: the amount of time needed to perceive a letter and decide 
which key to strike. A second component was keystroke speed: the 
amount of time needed to move the finger. Salthouse also recognized that 
skilled typing involves more than simply perceiving individual letters and 
striking individual keys. Skilled typists often respond in units; familiar 
words, for example, are typed faster than unfamiliar words. Thus another 
important variable in typing is preview span: the number of characters 
that the typist previews before typing a character. If more letters are 
previewed the probability of perceiving familiar blocks of letters (i.e., 
words) is increased. When the number of words that can be previewed is 
reduced by experimental manipulation, such as by controlling the number 
of characters available for preview, typing speed is reduced dramatically. 
Moreover, skilled typists have been found to preview on average almost 
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a third more letters than less skilled typists (Salthouse, 1984; Shaffer, 
1976). 
Controlling for level of experience, Salthouse found that older typists 
had significantly slower reaction time and keystroke speed than younger 
typists. However, the two groups did not differ in overall typing speed. It 
appeared that an age difference in the range of preview accounted for the 
overall equivalent performance of older and younger typists. That is, 
older typists had significantly greater preview spans, and therefore 
showed no deficit in their overall typing speed. 
There are at least two possible interpretations of the mechanisms in- 
volved in the maintenance of typing speed in older typists. The first 
interpretation is a compensation model: Loss in reaction time and key- 
stroke speed are assumed to cause gain in the range of preview. In Salt- 
house’s (1984) words: 
The existence of a significant relation between age and eye-hand span, indepen- 
dent of the relation between span and skill, suggests a possible mechanism that may 
allow older typists to compensate for lower perceptual-motor efficiency . . . That 
is, the span may be larger because the older typists have adapted to their slower 
rates of processing by planning further ahead, in effect, scheduling around the 
bottlenecks in the system as much as possible (p. 369). 
Salthouse did not specify exactly how this compensation could occur, 
but presumably the typist either consciously or unconsciously begins to 
focus on expanding the range of preview. This interpretation is often cited 
by life-span theorists as an example of possible gains in old age. Baltes 
(1987), for example, notes that older typists “cope with their loss in 
reaction time when typing individual letters by developing more extensive 
forward-processing of letter and word sequences” (p. 617). Again, this 
interpretation seems to assume that losses precede and cause gains. 
An alternate interpretation rests on the opposite (or no) assumption of 
a causal relation between loss and gain; that is, that gains and losses may 
be unrelated phenomena, or that a gain might actually cause a loss. The 
unrelated phenomenon model assumes that the gain in range of preview 
reflects a change in typing skill that results from experience, ii-regardless 
of reaction time and keystroke speed. Several researchers have demon- 
strated that increased experience in a specific skill (e.g., chess) can lead 
to qualitatively different ways of representing or processing information 
relevant to the skill (Anderson, 1982, 1987; Chi, Glaser, dz Farr, 1988). 
We believe that some aspects of typing skill (e.g., letter span) may im- 
prove simply through practice, thus maintaining typing speed overall. 
Simultaneously, but perhaps coincidentally, increased experience can 
lead to increased letter span, and increased age may lead to increased 
reaction and keystroke time. Figure 5 illustrates our conceptualization of 
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FIG. 5. The relation between age and different skills related to typing speed. 
this relation. Over the adult years, efficacy in basic skills (reaction time 
and keystroke speed) may be lost, and efficacy of higher level processes 
(eye-hand span) may be gained. The cumulative result of these processes, 
which may or may not be independent, would be maintenance of overall 
typing speed. 
Salthouse considered this interpretation, but stated that he preferred 
the first (compensation) interpretation. We believe that the second inter- 
pretation (unrelated phenomenon) seems at least equally plausible. In 
Salthouse’s study the correlation between age and years of typing expe- 
rience was quite high (.55), and thus one would expect that additional 
effects of experience would most likely be observed in the older subjects. 
One could argue that if the letter span increase is due to increased expe- 
rience, then very experienced younger typists should also exhibit high 
letter span. Even if this pattern were not observed, however, a compen- 
sation explanation might not be appropriate, because all forms of expe- 
rience may not be equal. Relatively intense experience, in which individ- 
uals practice typing extensively over a relatively short period of time, 
probably does not lead to the same type of expertise as the same total 
amount of practice distributed over a much greater period of time (Rybash 
et al., 1986). If acquisition of some forms of an expertise depend upon this 
type of distributed experience, then the acquisition of that expertise must 
occur over time and be related to age. 
This interpretation is consistent with the theoretical work of Rybash et 
al. (1986) and Perlmutter (1988a, 1988b), who have proposed theories of 
cognition across the life span. They suggested that in childhood and adult- 
hood, cognition is devoted primarily to the acquisition of knowledge, 
whereas in later adulthood, the primary focus is on the use and develop- 
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ment of skills acquired earlier. Because older typists have practiced their 
skills daily, they may have come to rely more heavily on higher level 
processing; such a process shift is characteristic of the move from novice 
to expert. In Adams (1987) et al.‘s words, “The implication here is that 
within those knowledge domains for which mature and older adults have 
developed an ‘expertise’, processing efficiency should not only be main- 
tained, but in addition, a shift would be expected toward the spontaneous 
activation of processing mechanisms which are more heuristic, integra- 
tive, and knowledge-based” (pp. 25-26). Rybash et al. (1986) refer to the 
process of focusing and developing specific domains as encapsulation; 
adult cognition focuses on maintaining and expanding extant knowledge 
within specific domains. Consequently, knowledge within specific do- 
mains becomes “more differentiated, accessible, usable, and ‘expert’ in 
nature” (Rybash et al., 1986, p. 17; see also Backman, 1985). 
The pervasiveness of the compensation model of gains in old age, and 
the relevance of the present interpretation, is further demonstrated in 
Chamess’ (1981b) investigation of the effects of age and experience in 
performance at chess. Charness found that older chess experts performed 
worse than younger experts in standard memory tasks, yet older experts 
were able to search through a series of possible moves, a critical skill in 
chess. In interpreting these results, Charness noted, “Thus we have the 
paradoxical situation that older players have less efftcient memory pro- 
cesses, as judged by recall tasks, yet more efficient search processes, as 
judged by move selection.” He then asked “What compensatory mech- 
anisms do older players rely on ?” (p. 20). Charness realized that addi- 
tional expertise may be acquired with age; he stated that “over the thou- 
sands of hours that they [older chess experts] have spent searching for 
moves, they too may have developed elaborate retrieval structures that 
enable them to chunk sequences of moves thereby enabling them to 
search deeply” (p. 21). However, like Baltes, Pascual-Leone, and Salt- 
house, Charness seems to imply that this gain in depth of search is applied 
only as compensation for loss. 
One example of the alternative interpretation of gains in old age comes 
from research on narrative processing by Adams, Labouvie-Vief, Hobart, 
and Dorosz (1987). These researchers suggest a possible shift across the 
life span in the interpretation and derivation of meaning from narrative 
text. When asked to recall and/or summarize a story, for example, ado- 
lescents and younger adults tend to focus on the literal meaning contained 
in the story’s propositional context, whereas midlife and older adults shift 
their focus to the moral implications (Adams, 1987; Adams et al., 1987). 
This difference was not interpreted as compensation, but rather as the 
result of the emergence in older adulthood of alternate ways of deriving 
meaning from narratives. 
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ALTERNATEAPPROACHESTORESEARCH 
In this section we consider the implications of the present perspective 
for research. A view of development that emphasizes losses and gains 
implies several modifications in the ways that developmental research 
should be conceptualized, developmental studies should be designed, and 
developmental data should be analyzed. A first research step involves 
identification of gains and losses that might occur at various portions of 
the life span. We believe that a greater focus on the context in which 
development occurs will make more obvious the presence of gain and 
losses because it will force researchers to consider in more detail the 
relevance of the developmental transition to the individual’s life. 
Several interpretations of the word context are relevant. The first con- 
cerns the relevance of the researchers’ tasks to the individuals being 
studied. For example, a very different interpretation of the overall effect 
on older adults’ competence is reached depending upon whether the re- 
searcher interprets observed losses in the context of the laboratory or on 
a job. In the former context, the focus, by default, is on losses; gains are 
rarely observed, we believe at least in part because research typically has 
not been motivated by assumptions that gains occur in old age. On the 
other hand, Salthouse’s research indicates that far different conclusions 
can be reached if overall performance is accessed in a context that is 
meaningful to the individual-in this case, on the job. Salthouse found 
that although older typists perceived and typed individual letters more 
slowly, their overall typing speed was not affected. We suggest that a 
fruitful direction for research is to consider losses and gains that are 
involved in the maintenance or increase in job performance in other pro- 
fessions (e.g. Perlmutter, Kaplan, & Nyquist, 1987). 
A second meaning of context concerns the relevance of particular life- 
events to development. Considering the importance of major life events 
can help to highlight the presence of losses and gains. This suggestion is 
consistent with what Baltes (1987) has called “age-graded” influences on 
development. For example, beginning school represents a major life tran- 
sition for 6-year-olds. As we have discussed, living through this transition 
might lead both to losses and gains. Researchers might be much more 
likely to notice both losses and gains if they considered their findings 
(e.g., the apparent loss in elementary school children’s problem-solving 
skills) in terms of the contextual influences on their subjects’ perfor- 
mantes . 
Culture and history are two additional senses of context that are rele- 
vant to a perspective that emphasizes losses and gains. What appears as 
a gain in one culture may be considered a loss in another. For example, 
researchers from western cultures might consider only the gains associ- 
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ated with schooling. However, members of other cultures might focus 
more on possible losses, such as those associated with removing the child 
from the work force during school hours, and perhaps limiting the child’s 
acquisition of job-relevant skills. Similarly, within a single culture, a gain 
at one point in history might be considered a loss at another point. For 
example, prior to the introduction of printing, human memory was the 
only vehicle for carrying individual and communal knowledge through 
time and space (See Olson, 1977; Perlmutter, 1988~). The art and skill of 
memory was extremely valued, and the mnemonist much admired (Yates, 
1966). As everyday needs for memory diminished, previous intrigue with 
memory skill declined and the status of the mnemonist changed. Indeed, 
around the 16th century strong memory assumed its present implication 
of weak judgment (Boorstin, 1983). 
Research on “U-Shaped Curves” 
The value of the present perspective for conceptualizing research is- 
sues also can be illustrated by considering research conducted under the 
rubric of “U-shaped curves.” In a “U-shaped curve” phenomenon, chil- 
dren’s performance begins at a relatively high level, decreases with age, 
and then returns back to or exceeds the original performance level. This 
research (e.g., Bever, 1982; Strauss & Stavy, 1982) is relevant because it 
represents an attempt to understand an apparent loss during child devel- 
opment. Reinterpreting research on U-shaped curves demonstrates the 
value of conceptualizing research issues from a perspective that empha- 
sizes simultaneous gains and losses. 
Strauss and Stavy (1982) suggested that the U-shaped curve phenom- 
enon is important in studying children’s cognitive development. In sev- 
eral domains, such as children’s understanding of the Fahrenheit temper- 
ature scale, development follows a U-shaped pattern. Strauss and Stavy 
indicated that the decline portion of the U-shaped curve represents a 
transition from a relatively simple, experience-based conception of the 
temperature scale to a more abstract understanding of the nature of heat, 
temperature, and measurement in general. 
However, to suggest that development in any domain can be modeled 
as a single curve, either straight or U-shaped, is to miss the point. Chil- 
dren’s performance on the single measure under study could indeed be 
described by a U shape, but the finding is an artifact of the combined 
effect of losses and gains. While one style of problem-solving emerges, 
another may decline. Attempts to describe development as any single 
curve do not capture the essential multidimensionality of human change. 
Klahr (1982) realized that the U-shaped curve phenomenon was an 
artifact of the way in which success or failure were defined in the exper- 
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iment. His refutation of the importance of U-shaped phenomena, how- 
ever, also demonstrates the apparent pervasiveness of the assumption 
that development is unidirectional. Klahr argued that U-shaped curves 
are a molecular description of a process that represents, at a molar level, 
a developmental increase. To support his contention, Klahr discussed an 
example not related to psychology in which “age-related” change ap- 
pears U-shaped at first glance but actually is not. 
Klahr’s example concerns the organizational development of a bank. If 
the performance of the bank is defined as the amount of time needed to 
obtain a loan, the development of the bank will take the form of a U- 
shaped curve. This pattern occurs at first because the bank is likely to 
have only one office, capable of handling all loan applications within a 
day. In the next stage, the bank adds several branches; loan applications 
at a branch now take several days to be processed because applications 
must be sent to the central office. The bank’s performance, as defined as 
the time needed to obtain a loan, has therefore declined. But if at a still 
later stage the bank acquires a computer to handle loan requests, perfor- 
mance will improve dramatically, thus leading to the U-shaped curve. 
Klahr argued that focusing on the single measure of loan processing time 
leads to the mistaken belief that the bank experienced a performance 
decrease in the middle stage of development. Overall performance of the 
bank in fact increased, even if there was a temporary decline in a single 
measure. 
Klahr argued that the bank example shows that the U-shaped curve 
description is meaningless: the bank only declined in a single measure on 
its way to becoming a more productive organization overall. We believe, 
however, that this example illustrates that gains and losses are both in- 
volved in any developmental change. From the perspective of the bank 
officer, the overall efficiency of the bank increased throughout all stages. 
But from the perspective of the customer who wished to have a loan 
approved, the bank experienced a strong “age-related” decline when it 
opened branches and began to take several days to process loan applica- 
tions. Klahr argued that this loss was trivial, but it is interesting to note 
that the focus on increasing organizational growth at the expense of basic 
customer satisfaction is a central criticism of American business and has 
been suggested as one cause of the loss of competitiveness to foreign 
competition. The point is that the loss of customer satisfaction is a real 
loss; by the standard from which banks are typically judged (i.e., profit), 
the gains in organization development outweigh the losses, but the losses 
eventually can outweigh the gains and lead to the failure of the bank. 
Determining Whether and How Gains and Losses Are Causally Related 
In the discussion of age-related change, both in adults’ typing skill and 
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children’s problem solving skills, we suggested that gains and losses 
might not be causally related, or if causally related, might not be related 
in the typically assumed direction. The primary purpose of these exam- 
ples was to demonstrate that age should not be assumed to determine the 
relation between gains and losses in development. Implicit in these dis- 
cussions is the need for further research on the relations between gains 
and losses in development. The search for mechanisms of development 
should be expanded to include analysis of the dynamics and possible 
direction of causality of gains and losses. 
How could one go about determining whether gains and losses ob- 
served in development are causally related, and, if causally related, the 
directionality of causality? Earlier we suggested that researchers apply 
the same criteria to the analysis of the relations between gain and losses 
as are applied in the analysis of any relation observed between two vari- 
ables (See Campbell & Stanley, 1966, for a description of these criteria). 
The researcher should of course consider whether the losses and gains 
observed are really unrelated phenomena. This consideration was raised 
in the discussion of Salthouse’s (1984) research on typing skills. Losses 
observed in keystroke speed probably are caused by biological aging, 
whereas gains in range of preview may be caused by separate processes 
related to experience. The apparent relation of gains and losses that are 
observed may simply reflect the focus of the researcher. If Salthouse had 
focused only on overall typing skill across the life span, he would have 
found no significant differences between age groups. 
Ideally, longitudinal data would be available. Salthouse suggests spe- 
cific predictions about the nature of age-related change in the components 
of typing skill. The compensation model predicts that gains should emerge 
relatively quickly and later than losses; that is, that gains should be ob- 
served only after losses have become severe enough to inhibit overall 
typing speed. If observed gains are caused by, or are responses to, losses, 
then the curve of increases may be abrupt, rather than gradual, and sub- 
sequent to rather than simultaneous with the curve of declines. These 
predictions could be assessed most accurately by assessing component 
skills in the same individuals across the life span. 
Collecting longitudinal data across the life span is of course extremely 
difficult and expensive. Fortunately, there are some issues related to 
typing speed that could be assessed using experimental or quasi- 
experimental methods. One issue is the mechanism by which older typists 
develop increased range of preview. One relevant hypothesis is that older 
typists choose to develop this new skill. This hypothesis could be tested 
by interviewing older typists. Were they aware of the declines in their 
perceptual and motor processes? If so, did they choose to compensate? 
Were they aware of the advantage of an increased eye-hand span? If so, 
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how did they learn this compensation, and how did they implement it into 
their day-to-day typing? Questions could also be addressed to novice 
typists of different ages. The model of gains and losses in typing skill that 
we prefer suggests that the expanded eye-hand span develops gradually 
with experience in typing. This view suggests that less experienced typ- 
ists who were informed about the effects of span-length on typing speed 
might not find this information useful in improving their typing speed. 
This hypothesis could be tested by telling typists at different levels of 
experience about the eye-hand span advantage, and assessing the effect 
on typing performance across a period of several months. 
Another possibility would involve including additional groups to form a 
complete age by experience factorial design. One limitation in Salthouse’s 
design is that age and experience are confounded. Adding cells to com- 
plete a factorial design might help to separate the effects of these vari- 
ables. Specifically, one could add to the design a group of older but less 
experienced typists, and a group of younger but expert typists. If de- 
creases in keystroke speed are due to the effects of aging on perception 
and motor skills, and gains in preview span are due to the effects of 
increased experience, then younger, inexperienced typists should dem- 
onstrate fast keystroke speeds but short preview spans; younger experi- 
enced typists should demontrate fast keystroke speeds and long preview 
spans. Older, experienced typists should show slow keystroke speeds but 
long preview spans; older, inexperienced typists should show slow key- 
stroke speeds and short preview spans. 
The issue of context also is important in considering gains and losses in 
typing skill. For example, a consideration of the historical context of 
typing skills research might lead to different perspectives on the observed 
losses and gains. One important historical difference between young and 
old typists is that old typists learned to type on manual typewriters, 
whereas many of the younger typists probably learned to type on electric 
typewriters. This difference might affect the relation between span length, 
finger movement, and overall typing speed. Another important point to 
consider is the factors that have led to the older typists maintaining their 
on-the-job performance. Would the same effect be observed in older typ- 
ists who began typing at middle age? Are individuals who continue to 
maintain their on-the-job performance the healthiest older adults? 
Similar issues are relevant in addressing the relation between gains and 
losses involved in the development of children’s problem-solving skills. 
We suggested that schooling could cause both the gains and losses ob- 
served in problem-solving skill; that is, that the observed relation between 
gains and losses might be spurious. There are at least three types of 
studies that could be conducted to address this issue. The first would 
involve assessing, through longitudinal research, the rates of changes 
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(both gains and losses) in children’s problem solving skills. The spurious 
model predicts a rather quick and dramatic effect of schooling. This 
model could be tested by assessing children’s skills for several months 
prior and subsequent to the time when they enter school. On the one 
hand, if schooling is the critical variable in determining both the losses 
and gains, then changes should be abrupt. On the other hand, if Baltes’ 
(1987) and Weir’s (1964) suppression model is correct, that is, if age- 
related gains in thinking skills cause losses in other domains, then the 
observed change should be more gradual, and within any subject sample 
correlations between relevant variables should be large but negative. 
Cross-cultural research also may be helpful in assessing causality and 
direction of causality in developmental gains and losses. In cultures 
where children begin school at different ages, the effects of schooling and 
age can be separated (See Stevenson et al., 1978; Stevenson, 1988). Stud- 
ies could be conducted to address more directly the types of problem- 
solving skills that researchers (e.g. Weir, 1964; Baltes, 1987) have sug- 
gested decline as children gain new skills (See Wilkinson et al., 1979). 
A third possible type of study to evaluate the relationship between 
gains and losses in children’s problem-solving might entail assessing the 
effects of alternate types of schooling, such as Montessori or home 
schooling, on gains and losses. If schooling does cause both the observed 
gains and observed losses, we would expect less dramatic effects in chil- 
dren who have not attended typical schools. Although one might argue 
that these children would represent a highly biased sample it should be 
possible to test whether their cognitive abilities and personality charac- 
teristics are different from children who attend more typical schools. 
Analysis of Data Concerning Losses and Gains 
The existence of gains and losses implies a multivariate approach to 
gains and losses, and standard analysis of variance techniques may be 
inadequate to test the alternative hypotheses suggested in this paper. One 
intriguing alternative is structural equation modeling, which allows re- 
searchers to test specific hypothesis about presumed causal relations be- 
tween different sets of variables (See Biddle & Marlin, 1987; Kenny, 
1979; Martin, 1987). Structural equation modeling could be particularly 
useful when longitudinal data is available, and can provide a much more 
satisfactory method of testing assumed causal relations than can more 
traditional methods, such as cross-lagged panel correlations (Gollob & 
Reichardt, 1987; Rogosa, 1979, 1980). One could, for example, consider 
modeling one set of observed behaviors as indicators of a latent under- 
lying variable of “losses” (e.g., laboratory-assessed perceptual-motor 
skills) and another observed set of variables (e.g., job-related increases, 
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wisdom, vocabulary) as indicators of a latent variable of “gains” (see 
Joreskog, 1979; Rogosa, 1979). The researcher then could specifically test 
the assumption of causality between gains and losses, as well as the 
direction of causality. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has presented several examples of how both gains and losses 
are involved in development during both early and late life. Understand- 
ing of these processes requires relinquishing the assumption that the oc- 
currence, and possible causal direction, of gains and losses are necessar- 
ily tied to time of life. We have shown that development can be more 
comprehensively understood by viewing gains and losses as changes that 
occur throughout life, and by keeping open any conclusions concerning 
causality of gains and losses at all points in the life span. The notion in 
life-span interpretations that gains and losses are causally related, and 
that the direction of causality is determined by age, may be a vestige of 
the traditional assumption that late life is a time primarily of loss and that 
early life is a time primarily of gain. 
Conceptions of the possible relations between developmental gains and 
losses probably will broaden as the life-span perspective matures. The 
life-span perspective on development is still a relatively new one. Be- 
cause of the strong assumption that late life was a time of exclusive 
decline, a demonstration of the possibility of compensation in old age may 
have been a necessary first step towards research and theory considering 
other possible relations between gains and losses across the life span. 
Research that considers new gains (e.g., wisdom; see Baltes, 1987; Hol- 
liday & Chandler, 1986) in old age that probably do not occur in response 
to loss illustrates the possibility of moving beyond a compensation model 
of growth in old age. 
Speculatively we suggest that there may be an opposite and perhaps 
equal reaction to every loss or gain across the life span. Rather than 
simply documenting gains or losses, developmentalists should focus on 
the possible co-occurrence or reciprocity of such change. When improve- 
ments are observed, questions should be raised about possible comple- 
mentary losses. Likewise, when losses are observed, questions should be 
raised about possible complementary gains. It is important, however, that 
in carrying out such analysis, researchers do not assume that the direction 
of causality is tied to time of life. Indeed, it should not even be assumed 
that such events necessarily are causally related. As we have shown, 
investigating alternative causes requires that the researchers consider the 
antecedents of both the observed gains and losses, as well as the context 
in which these changes occur. 
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Many more developmental transitions need to be considered from a 
perspective that emphasizes both gains and losses. Of particular impor- 
tance in this regard are further examples of losses in early life and gains 
in late life. Although such thinking may strike researchers and theorists as 
radical, we believe that the novelty of the approach will diminish with the 
emergence of new empirical evidence on the gains and losses experienced 
in both early and late life. We hope that this paper has offered a theoret- 
ical perspective from which to begin to collect such evidence. 
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